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This  paper  examines  the  repercussions  of  international  migration  on  children‟s  time  allocation  in 
households at origin. We focus on children of age 7 to 12 and distinguish three activities: market work, 
French school attendance, and enrollment in Medersa (Arab/Islamic traditional school). In our analysis, 
we account for heterogeneities in migration constraints considering differences in migration destinations 
and the number of migrants within households. We instrument for migration using policy and governance 
facets in destination countries, precisely France, Spain, and Italy. Results show that – after controlling for 
endogeneity – migration has a positive and significant impact on enrollment in French curriculum school. 
However, once we account for the destination of the migrant, this positive and significant impact is only 
verified in households with migrants in Europe. We also note that when the number of migrants within a 
household increases, children of age 7 to 12 are less likely to attend French school and they are more 
likely to be involved in paid work activities. We draw evidence from the 2009 Senegalese household 
survey on migration and remittances (Enquête Ménage sur la Migration et les Transferts de Fonds). 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of migration as a survival strategy to prevent or cope with economic hardship is 
well known. Yet, in 1956, Tiebout indicated that people “vote with their feet” to find the community that 
provides them with better opportunities. In Tiebout's prediction, whenever individuals encounter a deficit 
of wellbeing in their communities, they will move or migrate to areas that could allow them to better 
secure  their  livelihood  as  well  as  that  of  their  family.  Thereby,  an  interesting,  but  relatively  little 
examined, question concerns the repercussions of people‟s migration on the communities they left behind.  
The  issue  of  migration‟s  impact  on  the  sending  communities  has  been  stressed  by  the  New 
Economics  of  Labor  Migration  (NELM)  pioneered  by  Stark  (1978)  and  Stark  and  Levhari  (1982).  
According to the NELM theory, the migrant is part of a spatially extended household that acts collectively 
to lessen idiosyncratic risks by keeping cooperation over long distances. Thus, for a household, having a 
migrant member working elsewhere is a strategy to manage uncertainty, diversify the income portfolio 
and alleviate liquidity constraints through remittances (Stark, 1991). Remittances sent by migrants or 
inheritance left at origin represent potential means to smooth consumption (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989) 
and overcome credit or risk constraints for sending households (Lucas, 1987; Stark, 1991). However, 
migration might also induce perverse effects in sending households. These include loss of labor force and 
human  capital,  and  several  opportunity  costs  for  missing  working  capital,  skills,  and income  (Stark, 
1991). For instance, adults‟ absence because of migration may translate into less schooling for children as 
they are needed to undertake housework or market work to help meet short-term labor and cash shortages. 
Conversely, remittances could also increase the reservation wage of remaining household members, and 
so affect their labor participation and supply decisions.  
In sub-Saharan African, how migration affects those left behind remains not fully understood. 
There  is  a  relative  lack  of  systematic  and  quantitative  studies  –  that  go  beyond  anecdotes  -  about 
migration‟s repercussions on the sending communities. Yet, knowing these repercussions is of crucial 
interest for most African countries as they are experiencing greater than ever internal and international 
movements of people. This paper contributes to shedding light on the impact of migration in sending 
countries in Africa by exploring the effects of having a migrant in the household on children‟s activities. 
We  draw  evidence  from  Senegal,  taking  advantage  of  the  rich  dataset  from  the  2009  Senegalese 
household survey on migration and remittances (Enquête Ménages sur la Migration et les Transferts de 
Fonds). 
Senegal counts among the prominent emigration countries in sub-Saharan Africa. One Senegalese 
household  out  of  ten  counts  at  least  one  emigrant  among  its  members  (Daffé,  2008).  Emigrants 
represented 4.9 percent of the Senegalese population in 2010, compared to 2.5% for sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole (World Bank, 2011). Noticeably, numbers of these emigrants are highly skilled. In 2010, about [3] 
 
18 percent of the tertiary-educated Senegalese were abroad. Among them,  medical staff represents a 
significant proportion. About 51.4% of physicians born in Senegal have emigrated based on data from 
2000 (Clemens and Pettersson, 2006).  Else, Bhargava, Docquier, and Moullan (2010) reckon that there 
are 2.9% of physicians trained in Senegal who are outside the country in the same period. World Bank 
data also indicates that approximately 27% of nurses born in the country had emigrated in 2000 (World 
Bank, 2011). Conversely, Senegal figures among the top remittance recipients in sub-Saharan Africa; in 
2010, the country ranked fourth, behind Nigeria, Sudan, and Kenya. An estimated US$ 1.2 billion was 
sent into the country in the form of remittances in 2010, which represents about 9 percent of 2009 GDP. 
For comparison, in 2008, the net foreign direct investments (FDI) received by the country were US$ 0.7 
billion, while the net official development aid (ODA) was at US$ 1.1 billion (World Bank, 2011).  
Various factors explain the Senegalese population‟s readiness to migrate. Indeed, the main factor, 
which is largely demonstrated in the literature, is the long economic crisis that occurred in the mid-1970s 
and exacerbated in the 1990s. However, a significant driving factor is also the social representation of 
migration  and  migrants.  In  the  Senegalese  common  sense,  international  mobility  reflects  social 
advancement. In the social discourse on migration, a series of linguistic expressions shows how the social 
imagination structures such a representation. For instance, maxims from the Haalpular and the Wolof say: 
“The Haalpulaar know where they were born but not where they will be buried.”; “If you have a son, let 
him go; one day he will come back with either money or knowledge, or both.”; “It is better to suffer 
abroad than to remain poor at home.”; “It is better to be poor and suffer abroad than to stay wretched at 
home.”; “ He who does not travel will never know where it is best to live.”; “ He who returns from a trip 
and turns bad was not nice in the country where he lived.” (Tandian, 2010). 
This widespread readiness and desire to travel or migrate and the sizable magnitude of migration 
and remittances flows make Senegal an interesting setting for investigating migration‟s effects on those 
left  behind  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  repercussions  on  children‟s  time  use 
distinguishing  between  market  work,  household  chores,  and  school  attendance.  In  our  analysis,  we 
account  for  heterogeneities  in  migration  constraints  looking  at  differences  in  migration  destinations. 
Descriptive  evidence  -  from  the  survey  mentioned  above  -  indicates  that  Europe  is  the  preferred 
destination for Senegalese international migrants. More than 50 percent have gone to Europe, where Italy, 
Spain, and France are the most important countries of destination. The second important destination 
region  is  Africa,  which  attracts  24  percent  of  the  emigrants.  These  differences  in  the  migration 
destinations likely reflect different selection processes, and thereby may result in different effects on 
those left  behind.  Failure  to  account  for  variety  in  destinations  could  therefore  lead  to  serious  bias. 
Furthermore, we also account for differences in the number of migrants within migrant-households. Data 
indicate a large variability – across migrant-households - in the number of household members who are [4] 
 
abroad. The number of migrants in a household varies from one to twelve. This variability in the number 
of migrants might also reflect differences in migration selection processes. There are more opportunities 
to migrate as a result of the now well established and cumulative number of household members who 
have gone before. Therefore, the number of migrants in a given household should be considered as an 
important factor that might affect those left behind. 
This  paper  contributes to the literature  in  two  ways.  First,  for  school  attendance,  we  clearly 
distinguish  between  French  curriculum  school  and  Arab/Islamic  school  (usually  called  Daara  or 
Medersa). Treating school attendance uniformly, irrespective of whether a child is going to a French 
curriculum school or attending a Medersa, could leads to false results when the determinants of these two 
types of school attendance systematically differ. We consider a model of simultaneous choice between 
three occupations: market work, French curriculum school, and Medersa, controlling for all potential 
channels through which migration may affect children‟s time use. Our focus is on children aged 6 to 12 
years old. Our second contribution is related to the identification strategy we use to address a potential 
endogeneity  of  the  migration  variable.  We  rely  on  policy  and  governance  facets  in  the  destination 
countries to instrument for migration. More precisely, we use two variables for identification: i) the right-
wing  dimension  of  governments  in  Italy,  Spain,  and  France  (the  preferred  destination  countries  of 
Senegalese emigrants) between 1990 and 2010; ii) the second instrument is related to policies that have 
been implemented in these countries and that might facilitate or impede migration decisions to these 
countries.  
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  related  literature  of  the  study  is 
presented  in  section  2.  Section  3  describes  the  empirical  estimation  approach.  The  data  we  use  is 
presented in section 4 where some descriptive statistics are discussed. We then present and comment on 
the estimation results in section 5. The last section concludes. 
2. Related literature  
Several papers have studied the effect of migration or remittances on child labor, schooling, or 
educational attainment in developing countries. However, the results seem mixed and even contradictory 
across countries and also within the same country. Results vary according to the context. In Mexico, 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) estimate the overall impact of migration on educational attainment. They 
found that migration is positively associated with educational attainment for girls in rural communities 
and whose mothers have three years or less of education. For boys and for girls whose mothers are more 
educated, migration does not seem to have an effect. However, Borraz (2005) found that the positive 
effect reported by Hanson and Woodruff prevails only in villages with small populations (less than 2500 
residents). In larger villages, he did not notice a significant effect of migration on child schooling.  [5] 
 
Other studies contradict Hanson and Woodruff‟s finding and suggest the presence of negative 
effects  of  migration  on  schooling  in  rural  Mexico.  Evidence  from  McKenzie  and  Rapoport  (2006) 
indicates that migration depresses educational attainment for the majority of children in Mexico‟s rural 
communities. Using state historical migration rates to instrument for migration, McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2006) found a significant and negative effect of migration on schooling attendance and attainment for 
older children in rural Mexico. Besides, Antman (2010) found that the short run effect of a father‟s 
migration in Mexico is a reduction of the younger children‟s study hours and participation in school, 
while the older boys (12-15 years old) increase their work hours and work participation outside the home. 
Conversely, Cox-Edwards and Ureta, (2003) and Acosta (2006) studied the effects of migrant 
remittances on  schooling  in  El  Salvador,  and  both found  that  remittances promote  schooling  among 
children  within  migrant  sending  households.  Cox-Edwards  and  Ureta  (2003)  provide  evidence  that 
remittances reduced school dropout rates, while Acosta (2006) reports that children in migrant households 
are more likely to be enrolled in school, compared with children in households without migrants. In 
Pakistan, Mansuri (2006) reports a significant positive effect of migration on school attainment and child 
labor market activity in rural areas. Her results show that children in migrant households are not only 
more likely to attend school; they are also more likely to stay in school and accumulate more years of 
schooling in comparison to their counterparts in non-migrant households in the same village. They are 
also less likely to be involved in economic work and report working for substantially fewer hours. She 
also finds large gender differentials in the gains from migration to the benefits of girls. 
What all these studies have in common is their focus on the econometric challenges of estimating 
the effect of migration on the left-behind. As migration is a non-random selective process, assessing its 
impact requires controlling for the decision to migrate. Otherwise, the estimation results could be biased. 
The econometric problems related to controlling for the migration decision mainly refer to selection bias 
and endogeneity (omitted variables bias, reverse causation, etc) issues.   
Various approaches are used to address these issues. These approaches include using panel data 
analysis, difference-in-difference estimation, pre-post difference estimation, a propensity score matching 
approach, OLS methods, instrumental variable techniques, and experimental studies. In an interesting 
study,  McKenzie,  Gibson,  and  Stillman  (2006)  assess  the  performance  of  these  different  methods 
adopting as a benchmark an experimental study, which uses a migration lottery program in New Zealand 
as  a  natural  experiment.  Their  conclusion  is  that  in  the  absence  of  an  experimental  measure,  the 
instrumental variable technique performs best, conditional upon selection of a good instrument. 
In the literature, a wide range of instruments are used to address the econometric problems of 
migration estimation. This includes historic migration data (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Hildebrand and 
McKenzie, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006; Alcaraz, Chiquiar, and Salcedo, 2010), local weather [6] 
 
(Munshi, 2003), geography (Borraz, 2005), pre-migration distance (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman, 
2006), social networks (Acosta, 2006; Karamba, Quiñones, and Winters, 2011), cultural and sociological 
factors  (Mansuri,  2006);  visa  lottery  experiment  (McKenzie,  Gibson,  and  Stillman,  2006;  Gibson, 
McKenzie, and Stillman, 2011), and economic conditions at destination countries (Yang, 2008; Antman, 
2010). 
In what follows, we use governance conditions and migration policies at the destination countries 
for migration identification. We test two  types of instruments. The first instrument is the right-wing 
dimension of governments in Italy, Spain, and France (the preferred destination countries of Senegalese 
emigrants)  between  1990  and  2010.  The  second  instrument  is  related  to  policies  that  have  been 
implemented in these countries (during the above mentioned period), and that might facilitate or impede 
migration decisions to these countries. The intuition behind the choice of these variables is that they will 
act to limit migration possibilities from Africa to these countries. 
Immigration, and related issues such as integration, exclusion, and multiculturalism, dominates 
much  of  the  debate  concerning  European  politics.  The  subject  matter  is  often  contentious  and 
controversial: from violent attacks on ethnic minorities, to the arrival of illegal immigrants off the shores 
of Italy and Spain, to the electoral success of anti-immigrant radical right populist parties in Austria, 
Denmark, France, Italy, and Netherlands. Since the mid-1980s, radical right-wing populist parties have 
experience substantial gains in electoral support, allowing them to enter into coalition governments in 
Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark. Other successful radical right-wing populist 
parties remain part of the opposition (Flemish Interest in Belgium or the National Front in France). 
The  most  popular  item  in  the  radical  right‟s  political  agenda  concerns  its  opposition  to 
immigrants. And the way in which radical right-wing populist parties across Europe have fostered and 
capitalized on this topic poses important challenges for mainstream right and right-center parties. Within 
these parties, there exists tension between cultural conservatives who call for stricter immigration controls 
and employers who demand more immigrants. European right and right-center parties are now mostly in 
electoral dilemma. They must deal with tensions among supporters of right-wing populist parties that 
want to limit immigration, public fears concerning immigration and crime, and their traditional business 
constituency who realize that they require immigrant labor (Zaslove, 2006). This puts right and right-
center parties in strategic behaviors toward radical right populist parties in order to maximize their control 
over government cabinet, policy, and votes (de Lange, 2008).  In some countries (e.g. France and Italy), 
right and right-center parties deal with the pressure from radical right populist parties by adopting an 
increasingly tough stance on immigration (Guibernau, 2010). For instance in Italy, in the last fifteen years 
or so, a series of immigration laws has been passed in order to tighten immigration control and deterrence 
measures  (Martelli  Law,  1990;  Turco-Napolitano  Law,  1998;  and  Bossi-Fini  Law,  2002).  At  the [7] 
 
European Union (EU) level also, common legislations have been established for regulating the flows of 
migrants from outside the EU (for instance the Schengen single external border convention).  
Using this new stance of right and right-center parties on immigration in Europe, we generate our 
instrumental variables for migration identification. To construct these variables, we use the information 
on the left-right dimension of governments in the main Senegalese emigrants‟ destination countries in 
Europe (Italy, Spain, and France - ISF) at the time they move. Our focus on these three countries is based 
on the implicit assumption these are the preferred destinations for Senegalese emigrants. Therefore, other 
destinations are chosen only if migrants fail to make it to ISF. The implication is that policies that impede 
or favor migration to ISF also affect the choice for other destinations. We build our instrumental variables 
as follows. We consider three dummy variables indicating right-wing dominance of governments in ISF 
at the period of migration. The variable takes one if the migrant moves at a time when cabinets in ISF are 
right-wing oriented, zero otherwise. For those who have not yet migrated, the variable also takes one. We 
also consider a fourth variable, which indicates whether first migration occurred before the „Schengen 
single external border convention‟ or not.  
3. Estimation strategy 
The  allocation  decision  of  child‟s  time  is  often  addressed  using  a  multinomial  logit  model 
wherein child occupational status is sorted according to the different possible outcomes. One potential 
problem of this approach lies in the “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption which implies 
the relative likelihoods of any two alternative occupations are not influenced by the existence of other 
alternatives. Because of computational difficulties and data limits, multivariate probit models have not yet 
been widely applied in the analysis of child occupational status (Cigno and Rosati, 2005; Kis-Katos, 
2007).  In  what follows,  we  use  multivariate  probit models  to jointly  estimate  the occupation choice 
between  market  work/French  curriculum  school/Medersa  for  children  in  Senegal.  To  estimate  the 
parameters of the models, we apply simulated maximum likelihood procedures using the mvprobit, mvnp 
and mdraws routines developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003, 2006).  
We  consider  three  dependent  variables  of  interest  (market  work/French  curriculum 
school/Medersa), defined as binary indicator variables that indicate whether a child participates in a given 
activity. Then we use the trivariate probit model to estimate the determinants of child‟s time allocation 
between  these  three  occupations.  In  this  estimation,  we  account  for  the  possibility  that  unobserved 
characteristics of households playing a role in child‟s time allocation also influence household migration 
status. 
The empirical analysis estimates simultaneously the three participation decisions in market work, 
French school and Medersa resulting from parents‟ optimal decisions. The three latent variables (market [8] 
 
work
 L ,  French  school
 F ,  and Medersa
 D )  depend  on  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables  X,  three 
unknown vectors of parameters D F L    , , , and the normally distributed error terms D F L    , , .  
As  the  three  choices  are  conflicting  alternatives  of  children‟s  time  use,  and  are  determined 
simultaneously by the same decision making process, the same X vector of explanatory variables is 





















                                                                                     (1) 
The three equations from (1) are then mapped into three binary variables    D F L j Yj , ,   that 
take one if the child engages in a given occupation, and zero otherwise. 
  D F L j X Y j j j , ,       0 1                                                                (2)            
The  estimation  methodology  is  as  follows.  First,   we  decompose  the  vector  of  explanatory 
variables X into an endogenous migration variable M and a vector of exogenous variables 1 Z . Then, we 
test  for the  endogeneity  of the migration variable using a procedure suggested  in Rivers  and  Vuong 
(1988). This procedure consists of a two-stage approach where the estimated error from the first-stage 
regression  is  added  as  an  explanatory  variable  in  the  second -stage  regression  to  obtain  consistent 
estimates.  Rivers  and  Vuong  indicate  that  the  coefficient  of  the  error  term  will  constitute  a  test  for 
endogeneity (see also Smith and Blundell, 1986). Using this procedure, the migration variable M is first 
regressed on a set of exogenous explanatory variables 1 Z and a set of instruments 2 Z . Then, the residuals 
ˆ  from the first stage are included as another regressor in each occupation equation.  
We estimate the following model: 
        2 2 1 1 Z Z M                                                                                  (3) 
  D F L j M Z Y j j j j j , ,       0 ˆ 1 1 1                                               (4) 
The error terms in (3) and (4) are jointly normal. Note that the error term in (4) is decomposed 
into two error components    ˆ j  and  j  .   
The joint estimation of the three participation equations (4) involves evaluating the log-likelihood 
over  N i ,....., 1   observations, based on a joint trivariate probability: 
  

    
N
i
FD Di Fi LD Di Li LF Fi Li D i Di F i Fi L i Li k k k k k k Z k Z k Z k L
1
3 , , , , , ln                          (5) 
Where:  [9] 
 
    3   is the trivariate normal cumulative density function,  
    D F L j M Z Z j j j j i , ,       ˆ 1 1            are the combinations of explanatory 
variables and coefficients as in (4),  
  FD LD LF    , ,  are the three correlation coefficients of the error terms between 
the equation (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003; 2006), and  
  D F L k , ,  are the matching sign variables which equal to one if a child engages in a 
given occupation, and minus one otherwise (Greene 2003; Wooldridge, 2002).  
Next,  we  estimate  the  impact  of  the  number  of  migrants  within  households  on  children‟s 
activities. Using as always, the Rivers and Vuong procedure, we replace the binary variable M (equation 
3) with N, which is the number of migrants per household. The variable N is assumed to follow a count 
process and we estimate it using the negative binomial model to account for any over-dispersion. A nice 
facet of the negative binomial model is that the Poisson model is nested within it. The negative binomial 
probability distribution of N is given by:  
𝑃𝑟 𝑁 = 𝑛 𝜇,𝗼  =
Γ 𝗼−1 + 𝑛 








𝜇 + 𝗼−1 
𝑛
 
where Γ(•) is the gamma function. The mean of the negative binomial distribution (like the Poisson) is µ 
but the variance is 𝜇 1 + 𝗼𝜇 , where α is called the dispersion parameter of the gamma distribution. The 
negative  binomial  model  is  a  more  general  model than  the  Poisson,  because it  accommodates  over-
dispersion and it reduces to the Poisson model as α → 0 (for further details see: Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998 and Greene, 2008).   
4. Data and descriptive analysis 
We use data from the survey “Enquête Ménages sur la Migration et les Transferts de Fonds.” This 
survey was conducted in 2009 by the Consortium pour la Recherche Economique et Sociale (CRES) of 
the University of Dakar in partnership with the World Bank. The dataset contains rich information about 
migration and remittances at household level in Senegal. The household questionnaire consists of ten 
different books, which collect information about households and individuals‟ characteristics, education, 
employment, dwelling characteristics, migration, remittances and transfers, return migrants, migration 
destinations, remittance channels, financial services utilizations, household expenditures and assets, etc.  
The  dataset  contains  information  on  the  educational  profile  and  the  main  socio-economic 
activities of all household members aged 4 years old and above. However, the survey did not collect 
information on the amount of time devoted to these activities. Therefore, the variables on individuals‟ [10] 
 
activities will be defined as binary indicators, which show whether an individual participates in a given 
activity or not. Note that the information collected focuses only on the main activity, so that one will not 
be able to consider cases where individuals combine different activities. 
In our study sample, we only consider households with at least one child between the ages 6 and 
12 (2857 children). We target this age group because decisions about child schooling in Senegal are often 
made at around age 7, and this age class allows us to account for late entry to school. We model the 
activity of only the children of this age group in each household. A child is defined as working if his/her 
main activity is in the form of market work. Market work comprises all productive activities targeting the 
market  regardless  of  whether  they  are  performed  within  or  outside  of  the  household.    Market  work 
includes paid work (in cash or in kind) and unpaid work on family farms or businesses. Children are 
classified as students in French curriculum school or in Medersa if their main activity is attending one of 
these forms of school at the time of the survey. 
Table 1 shows the proportion of children per activity and by migration status of the household. 
About 70 percent of children in our sample report attending French curriculum school and 6 percent 
attend Medersa. At the same time, only 4 percent of children of the full sample report being involved in 
paid work. We note that the distribution shows some differences between children‟s activities depending 
on household migration status and the destination of the migrants. The proportion of children going to 
French school is a bit higher for children living in households with migrants, particularly with migrants 
who are in Europe (77 percent). And there are fewer children in households with migrants in Europe who 
are attending Medersa (4 percent). In contrast, children living in households with migrants in Africa are 
going less to French school (65 percent) and attend the Medersa more (9 percent). Furthermore, a large 
number of children are reported as idle (around 20 percent). This is a phenomenon quite common to 
surveys conducted in developing countries. It has been argued to result from both the under-reporting of 
child work, and the low productivity of child labor (Cigno and Rosati, 2005). 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations.  
5. Results 
The presentation of the results is organized as follows. First, we present some diagnostic tests 
showing whether our instruments are good or not (relevance and validity). In a second step, we present 
and  discuss  the  estimation  results,  considering  only  whether  children  are  living  in  households  with 
international  migrants  or  not.  Next,  we  account  for  emigrants‟  destinations,  distinguishing  between 
Europe and Africa. Finally, we present the results wherein we estimate the impact of the number of 
migrants within a household. [11] 
 
5.1  Instruments 
We check the strength of the proposed instruments using estimates from the univariate IV-probit 
regressions of our three dependent variables. Table 3 reports the results from the first-stage regressions of 
the IV-probit estimations and a number of diagnostics tests. We use the STATA command „rivtest‟ to test 
the over-identification restriction and the strength of our instruments. The strength of the instruments is 
tested against the null hypothesis of weak instruments, as suggested in Stock and Yogo (2002). Results 
indicate  that  the  joint  test  of  the  instruments‟  relevance  (F-tests)  is  highly  significant.  In  all  three 
specifications, the F-statistic of joint significance of the instruments exceeds 10, which is the threshold 
recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997). This implies that the instruments are relevant. Besides, we 
also find that the weak instrument problem is not present in our estimations using the Anderson-Rubin 
(AR)  and  Conditional  Likelihood  Ratio  (Moreira‟s  CLR)  (Moreira,  2003)  tests.  The  CLR  p-values 
indicates that migrations estimates are highly significant (at the 1% level), regardless of the definition of 
the  instrumental  variables,  except  for  Medersa.  The  AR  tests  also  report  p-values  indicating  high 
significance, at least at the 5% level, except also for Medersa.  
Moreover, the test of over-identification restrictions supports the validity of the instruments. The 
null hypothesis is not rejected in all three equations. 
5.2  The impact of international migration  
Table  4  reports  the  results  from  the  multivariate  probit  model  wherein  we  control  for  the 
household migration status. The first panel of the table gives the estimates of the migration variable from 
the regression, ignoring potential endogeneity of the variable. Results show that the migration effect is 
positive and significant (at the 10 % level) for French school attendance, negative and significant (at the 
10 % level) for paid work, and negative but non-significant for Medersa attendance. This suggests that 
children in households with international migrants are not only more likely to enroll in French curriculum 
school; they are also less prone to be involved in paid work activities or to enroll in Medersa. Once we 
instrument for migration, the sign of its effect on the different activities remains the same but with a 
larger size. However, the negative impact loses significance for paid work activity, while the significance 
level increases for the positive effect on French school attendance. In contrast, the impact on Medersa 
attendance remains non significant.  
Results also show that the residual from the first stage regression is negative and significant for 
French schooling, and positive and non significant for both paid work and Medersa. As the coefficient of 
the residual is significant (at least for French school) we can reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity 
of the migration variable. Then, not correcting for endogeneity of migration would underestimate its [12] 
 
effect  on  children‟s  activities.  Also,  a  negative  residual  coefficient  suggests  that  among  migrant 
household, there exist some characteristics that make children less likely to attend French school.  
The bottom panel of table 4 gives the estimates of the correlation coefficients between our three 
activities.  A  correlation  coefficient  between  two  activities  summarizes  the  association  between 
unobservable child-specific factors determining the likelihood of a child‟s involvement in one activity and 
those determining its engagement in the other activity. Results show a significant exclusion between 
attending French school and involvement in any of the two remaining activities (paid work or Medersa). 
The correlation coefficients between French school attendance and paid work or Medersa are -0.65 and -
0.76 respectively. This means that children who are engaged in paid work activity or who are enrolled in 
Medersa  have  unobserved  characteristics  that  make  them  less  likely  to  enroll  in  French  school.  In 
contrast, the coefficient correlation between paid work and Medersa is positive and significant albeit 
small, suggesting commonalities between the unobserved characteristics determining a child‟s enrollment 
in Medersa or engagement in paid work activities.   
Conversely, we note a significant impact of the living arrangements on children‟s activities. Most 
notably, the number of children under five years of age and the number of older persons (65 years old and 
more) negatively and significantly affects the propensity of children of age 7 to 12 to attend school.  
5.3  Does destination matter? 
To look at the impact of emigrants‟ destinations, we only focus on two destinations: Europe and 
Africa. In our sample, we drop households with migrants in other regions. Table 5 shows the results of 
our estimations. The migration variable, when exogenous, has a positive and significant impact on French 
school attendance whatever the destination. It also has negative and significant effects in both destinations 
for  paid  work.  The  impact  on  Medersa  attendance  is  negative  in  both  destinations  but insignificant. 
However, once we instrument for the migration variables, the significance, the size, and the sign of the 
effects change. After controlling for endogeneity, the variable designating having migrants in Africa loses 
the significance of its positive impact on French school enrollment while its negative impact on paid work 
become stronger with a higher level of significance. In contrast, the variable „having a migrant in Europe‟ 
picks up a stronger positive impact on French school attendance. At the same time its impact on paid 
work losses significance and becomes positive. This finding suggests that the positive and significant 
impact of migration on French school in table 4 is likely mainly attributable to households with migrants 
in Europe.  
5.4  Number of migrants 
Table 6 reports the parameter estimates of the multivariate probit model of children‟s activities, 
controlling for the number of migrants within households. The first panel of the table gives the estimates [13] 
 
the variable „number of migrants‟ taking it as exogenous. The results show a negative and significant 
impact on French schooling, a positive and significant impact on paid work activity, and a negative but 
very small and insignificant effect on Medersa attendance. Once we control for the endogeneity of the 
variable, the significance level and the size of the impact increase for all three activity equations, the sign 
remaining the same. These result suggest that when the number of migrants a given household increase, 
children of age 7 to 12 in this household are less likely to attend French school or Medersa and they are 
more likely to engage in paid work activities. This result contrasts with our previous finding, which 
indicates that children in households with migrants have higher propensities to enroll in French school 
and are less likely to work. This would suggest then that the positive effect of migration on French school 
attendance is conditioned on a threshold number of migrants beyond which migration has a depleting 
effect.  
6. Conclusion 
This paper focuses on the repercussions of international migration on children‟s time allocation in 
households at origin. We focus on children of age 7 to 12 and distinguish between three activities: market 
work,  French  school  attendance,  and  enrollment  in  Medersa.  In  our  analysis,  we  account  for 
heterogeneities in migration constraints, considering differences in migration destinations and the number 
of  migrants  within  households.  We  instrument  for  migration  using  policy  and  governance  facets  in 
destination  countries,  precisely  France,  Spain,  and  Italy.  Results  show  that  –  after  controlling  for 
endogeneity – migration has a positive and significant impact on enrollment in French curriculum school. 
However, once we account for the destination of the migrant, this positive and significant impact is only 
verified in households within migrants in Europe. We also note that when the number of migrants with a 
household increases, children of age 7 to 12 are less likely to attend French school and they are more 
likely to be involved in paid work activities.   [14] 
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Table 1: Activities of Children aged 6 -12 by migration status of the household (%) 
  Activities 
Works  Attends French 
school  Attends Medersa  No occupation 
Number of 
children aged 
6 - 12 
Mean  Std. 
dev.  Mean  Std. 
dev.  Mean  Std. 
dev.  Mean  Std. 
dev.   
Overall sample  0.04  0.19  0.71  0.45  0.06  0.25  0.19  0.39  2857 
Non-migrant 
household  0.05  0.21  0.69  0.46  0.07  0.26  0.19  0.39  1644 
Migrant household  0.02  0.15  0.73  0.44  0.06  0.24  0.18  0.39  1213 
Europe Migrant 
household  0.02  0.14  0.77  0.41  0.04  0.20  0.16  0.37  694 
Africa Migrant 
household  0.03  0.16  0.65  0.47  0.09  0.29  0.22  0.42  463 [18] 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Type of households 
 
Overall sample  With migrant  Without migrant 
Variables    mean  Std. dev.  mean  Std. dev.  mean  Std. dev. 
household head is  male  0.70  0.46  0.59  0.49  0.76  0.42 
Age of the household head  52.70  14.27  54.22  15.29  51.72  13.50 
Household head is self-employed  0.57  0.49  0.50  0.50  0.61  0.49 
Household head ever attended school  1.69  0.46  1.68  0.47  1.70  0.46 
Proportion of rural households  0.43  0.49  0.42  0.49  0.44  0.50 
Proportion of households in Dakar  0.19  0.39  0.24  0.42  0.16  0.37 
Proportion of households in other cities  0.38  0.48  0.34  0.48  0.40  0.49 
Household size  10.85  5.74  12.20  6.56  9.99  4.96 
Proportion of households owning agricultural lands  0.47  0.50  0.46  0.50  0.48  0.50 
Number of children aged 0-5  1.90  1.84  2.17  2.04  1.73  1.69 
Number of children aged 6-12  2.41  1.71  2.59  1.91  2.29  1.55 
Number of children aged 13-16  1.01  1.10  1.14  1.21  0.92  1.01 
Number of children aged 17-20  1.04  1.14  1.21  1.26  0.93  1.04 
Number of members aged 65 and +  0.42  0.63  0.54  0.70  0.34  0.58 
Female literacy rate  0.12  0.27  0.15  0.28  0.11  0.26 
Male literacy rate  0.22  0.37  0.26  0.38  0.20  0.36 
Proportion of households with a landline  0.19  0.39  0.28  0.45  0.13  0.33 
Number of migrants  0.97  1.29  1.69  1.29  0  0 










Table 3: Univariate IV-probit estimations and diagnostic tests 
First-stage regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Migrant household 
 
Variables  Coeff.  Std. dev. 
 
 
Schengen unified visa system  0.18
***  0.03 
   
Right-wing government in France                         -0.25
***  0.02 
   
Right-wing government in Italy                         -0.18
***  0.02 
   
Right-wing government in Spain                         -0.30
***  0.02 
   
Migrant is a male (ref: female)  0.02  0.02 
   
Migrant age                                              0.01  0.00 
   
Rural  -0.05
**  0.02 
   
Female literacy rate  0.013
**  0.04 
   
- 
       
Constant  0.55
***  0.06 
   




French School  Paid work  Medersa 
 
Coeff.  Std. dev.  Coeff.  Std. dev.  Coeff.  Std. dev. 
Migrant household  0.649
***  0.133  -0.845
***  0.234  -0.155  0.189 
Diagnostic tests 
First-stage F-statistics  59.81
*** 
Exogeneity test (p-value)  0.0000  0.0003  0.4099 
Over-identification test (p-value)  0.1919  0.6053  0.1515 
AR Wald Chi
2 (p-value)  0.0000  0.0046  0.2013 
CLR (p-value)  0.0000  0.0003  0.4100 
CLR confidence set  [0.402, 0.918]  [-1.300,-0.391]  [-0.523,  0.211] 
Number of observations  2826 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 [20] 
 
Table 4: The impact of migration on children’s activities 
                                           Schooling         Paid work           Medersa    




   0.032 
  (0.114) 
Migrant household (endogenous)                 0.934***         -0.465            -0.017    
                                             (0.320)           (0.672)           (0.330)    
Child is a boy (ref: girl)                    -0.223***          0.247*            0.475*** 
                                             (0.075)           (0.139)           (0.116)    
Child age                                      0.202***         -0.006            -0.040    
                                             (0.021)           (0.037)           (0.025)    
Head of household is self-employed            -0.053             0.259             0.475*** 
                                             (0.123)           (0.211)           (0.177)    
Head of household ever went to school         -0.201             0.071             0.400**  
                                             (0.162)           (0.279)           (0.200)    
Rural                                         -0.263**           0.514**           0.157    
                                             (0.123)           (0.237)           (0.178)    
Agricultural land                             -0.268**          -0.058             0.523*** 
                                             (0.124)           (0.228)           (0.178)    
Number of children less than 5                -0.051*            0.051             0.076**  
                                             (0.029)           (0.051)           (0.035)    
Number of children 6-12 yrs-old               -0.032             0.016            -0.065**  
                                             (0.031)           (0.046)           (0.030)    
Number of children 13-16 yrs-old               0.043             0.066            -0.044    
                                             (0.042)           (0.062)           (0.050)    
Number of children 17-20 yrs-old              -0.036            -0.030            -0.013    
                                             (0.044)           (0.079)           (0.054)    
Number of older persons, 65 and more          -0.199**           0.151             0.098    
                                             (0.079)           (0.104)           (0.098)    
Female literacy rate                           0.602           -17.744***         -0.136    
                                             (0.395)           (5.291)           (0.493)    
Male literacy rate                             0.496***         -0.107            -0.752**  
                                             (0.189)           (0.465)           (0.369)    
Fitted residual of migration equation         -0.107***          0.048             0.018    
                                             (0.038)           (0.076)           (0.038)    
Constant                                      -0.541            -2.759***         -2.954*** 
                                             (0.395)           (0.885)           (0.532) 
rho21  -0.647*** 
rho31  -0.756*** 
rho32  0.187*** 
chi2_c  249.757*** 
N  1704.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
   [21] 
 
Table 5: The impact of migration destinations on children’s activities 
                                           Schooling         Paid work           Medersa 
Migrant destination, Africa (exogenous)                    0.179**  -0.326**     -0.055 
  (0.081)  (0.136)     (0.108) 
Migrant destination, Europe (exogenous)                  0.220***  -0.257*     -0.172 
  (0.080)  (0.143)     (0.124) 
 
Migrant destination, Africa (endogenous)       0.272            -1.509***         -0.293    
                                             (0.189)           (0.403)           (0.261)    
Migrant destination, Europe (endogenous)       0.713***          0.047            -0.398    
                                             (0.152)           (0.302)           (0.245)    
Child is a boy (ref: girl)                    -0.222***          0.271***          0.350*** 
                                             (0.058)           (0.098)           (0.085)    
Child age                                      0.184***          0.016            -0.014    
                                             (0.016)           (0.022)           (0.019)    
Head of household is self-employed            -0.087             0.251*            0.348*** 
                                             (0.069)           (0.133)           (0.109)    
Head of household went to school              -0.270***          0.511***          0.378*** 
                                             (0.083)           (0.171)           (0.139)    
Rural                                         -0.239***          0.529***          0.185*   
                                             (0.073)           (0.130)           (0.110)    
Agricultural land                             -0.432***          0.170             0.486*** 
                                             (0.073)           (0.129)           (0.115)    
Number of children less than 5                -0.041***          0.030             0.063*** 
                                             (0.015)           (0.024)           (0.020)    
Number of children 6-12 yrs-old               -0.026*           -0.015            -0.049**  
                                             (0.014)           (0.023)           (0.019)    
Number of children 13-16 yrs-old               0.041*            0.032            -0.021    
                                             (0.023)           (0.044)           (0.037)    
Number of children 17-20 yrs-old              -0.049**          -0.024            -0.025    
                                             (0.023)           (0.041)           (0.039)    
Number of older persons, 65 and more          -0.198***         -0.035             0.131**  
                                             (0.044)           (0.077)           (0.063)    
Female literacy rate                           0.631**         -18.331***         -0.200    
                                             (0.254)           (2.046)           (0.369)    
Male literacy rate                             0.572***         -0.167            -0.646**  
                                             (0.145)           (0.274)           (0.309)    
Fitted residual of Africa destination         -0.032             0.154***          0.045    
                                             (0.021)           (0.041)           (0.028)    
Fitted residual of Europe destination         -0.079***          0.005             0.046    
                                             (0.017)           (0.038)           (0.029)    
Constant                                       0.005            -3.387***         -2.786*** 
                                             (0.222)           (0.447)           (0.352)    
 
rho21                                      -0.644*** 
rho31                                      -0.710*** 
rho32                                      0.206*** 
chi2_c                                      395.050*** 
N                                         2477.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   [22] 
 
Table 6: The impact of the number of migrants on children’s activities 
                                           Schooling         Paid work           Medersa    






Number of migrants (endogenous)               -0.085***          0.096**          -0.078*   
                                             (0.029)           (0.048)           (0.041)    
Child is a boy (ref: girl)                    -0.233***          0.245*            0.450*** 
                                             (0.071)           (0.140)           (0.105)    
Child age                                      0.203***         -0.003            -0.051**  
                                             (0.020)           (0.032)           (0.024)    
Head of household is self-employed            -0.021             0.228             0.409*** 
                                             (0.078)           (0.161)           (0.121)    
Head of household ever went to school         -0.287***          0.091             0.427**  
                                             (0.098)           (0.223)           (0.168)    
Rural                                         -0.284***          0.546***          0.161    
                                             (0.086)           (0.190)           (0.134)    
Agricultural land                             -0.305***         -0.029             0.474*** 
                                             (0.089)           (0.172)           (0.154)    
Female literacy rate                           0.714**         -16.288***         -0.057    
                                             (0.296)           (1.432)           (0.426)    
Male literacy rate                             0.631***         -0.125            -0.851**  
                                             (0.146)           (0.352)           (0.335)    
Fitted residual of number of migrants          0.073            -0.150             0.214**  
                                             (0.066)           (0.131)           (0.103)    
Constant                                      -0.120            -2.882***         -2.690*** 
                                             (0.274)           (0.738)           (0.433)    
rho21                                      -0.639*** 
rho31                                      -0.763*** 
rho32                                      0.183*** 
chi2_c                                      253.240*** 
N                                         1704.000 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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